


















Joblessness among the young accounts for a
substantial portion of total unemployment in
the United States. In 1978, approximately half
of all unemployed workers were less than 25
years old. Teenagers alone were responsible
for more than one-fourth of total unemploy-
ment. In 1978, when the overall unemploy-
ment rate averaged about 6 percent, the teen-
age unemployment rate topped 16 percent.
Since unemployment rates critically influ-
ence the conduct of macroeconomic and labor-
market policy, economists have come to realize
the necessity of identifying the origins of the
high and growing rates of youth unemploy-
ment that the nation has experienced in recent
years. To this end, numerous studies have at-
tempted to identify factors contributing to the
adverse performance of youth in the labor
market, and to determine how much of their
unemployment represents a serious problem
for our society. I
An individual is classified as unemployed if
he is seeking part-time or full-time employ-
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ment but is not currently working. Much of
the discussion concerning youth unemploy-
ment has focused on developments which may
have adversely affected the availability of
work-i.e., the demand for youthful labor.
Several studies, for example, have identified
minimum-wage legislation as a major contrib-
utor to measured youth unemployment, be-
cause it raises the cost of unskilled labor and
thereby reduces the demand for such labor. 2 A
study by James F. Ragan suggests that as much
as 4 percentage points of the increase in youth
unemployment between 1966 and 1972 can be
traced to increases in the minimum wage and
to extension of its coverage.
3
Other economists have suggested that the
movement of industry away from the central
city has made job opportunities less available
to the heavy concentrations of poor urban
youth. This may particularly have affected the
demand for labor of minority youth.
4 Trends
in general macroeconomic conditions also may
have weakened the demand for youth labor.
Richard Freeman concludes, for example, that
employment of youth is very sensitive to the
industrial composition of jobs and the general
condition of the economy. Areas with heavy
trade and service employment and rapid eco-
nomic growth tend to have better youth em-
ployment opportunities than elsewhere.s
Although these and other factors affecting
labor demand have undoubtedly contributed
to youth unemployment, supply-side influences
can also play a significant role. Changes in
attitudes or changes in family economic cir-
cumstances over the last several decades may
have reduced young people's willingness tosupply their labor. Such changes may increase
measured unemployment if they reduce young
people's willingness to accept or keep available
jobs even though they continue to report an
interest in finding work.
In this view, youth find jobs available, but
their unrealistic wage expectations or their
preference for leisure cause more casual or
protracted search for employment, thereby
generating increases in measured unemploy-
ment. Among the factors possibly contributing
to such behavior is family welfare assistance.
Although the concentration of youth unem-
ployment in areas with traditionally large wel-
fare populations-such as central cities-is
suggestive of a link between welfare and un-
employment, there are problems in establish-
ing a strong empirical case for such a relation-
ship. When using traditional aggregate data or
data from panel surveys, it is difficult to con-
trol for all of the factors which may influence
behavior. Also, it is difficult to disentangle
cause and effect: families may be on welfare
because of the unemployment of their mem-
bers and not the other way around.
This paper investigates the relationship be-
tween family welfare assistance and youth la-
bor-market behavior using data from a con-
trolled welfare experiment. Welfare policy
evaluation increasingly depends on experimen-
tation, because the economic environment of
the subjects can be experimentally manipu-
lated and thus the direction ofcause and effect
can be made clear. In addition, the availability
of a control group permits the impact of a
welfare program to be isolated from other ef-
fects (such as changing macroeconomic con-
ditions) which might affect labor-market be-
havior as well. (Appendix A contains a
discussion of the use of experiments in eco-
nomic analysis.)
The results demonstrate the potential im-
portance of supply-side factors in determining
the labor-market behavior of youth. Although
the specific data used here are not ideally
suited to direct measurement of unemploy-
ment rates, the results are suggestive of an
association between youth unemployment and
welfare assistance. After a brief discussion of
the theoretical link between these variables,
the paper describes the experiments that gen-
erated the data used in the research, as well
as the method of empirical analysis. The paper
concludes with a discussion ofthe experiment's
results and their policy implications.
I. Welfare and Youth Unemployment
Why should family welfare assistance influ-
ence youth labor-market behavior? To under-
stand the circumstances under which such a
linkage might exist, we must (1) review the
effects of a welfare program on the economic
environment of the family, (2) discuss how the
effects of family assistance are transmitted to
youth, and (3) examine the likely response of
youth to these stimuli. Each of these points
has received considerable attention in the lit-
erature.
6 Rather than attempt a survey of ear-
lier work, we simply summarize below the key
implications of earlier theoretical work.
Although the specific characteristics of ex-
isting and proposed welfare programs vary
considerably, most have a number of features
in common. An obvious common feature is
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the provision of non-wage income to recipient
families through support or benefit payments.
By supplementing earned income, welfare pro-
grams expand the budgetary opportunities of
the affected family. A second feature offamily-
assistance plans is their incorporation of pro-
cedures to "phase out" support as the earned
income of the family rises. This is accom-
plished by reducing the welfare benefits by a
fixed fraction of additional earned income. In
effect, this linkage of benefits to earned in-
come is a "tax" on earned income, which re-
duces the perceived net wage associated with
additional work. For example, in the original
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, this tax rate was (statuto-
rily) 100 percent, because support was reducedone dollar for each dollar of additional earned
income. In effect, the perceived net wage on
the margin was zero because of the implicit
lOO-percent tax.
Thus welfare programs influence both the in-
come of the family and a major price varia-
ble-the net wage. In the case in which welfare
support is received by a single individual
(rather than a family), the implications of
these features are straightforward. The sup-
increases the non-wage income of the in-
dividual, and the tax provisions reduce the re:
turns to additional work on the margin. As we
will show later, the individual likely will re-
spond to these changes by increasing con-
sumption and reducing the amount of time
worked, relative to someone for whom welfare
is not available.
The implications of welfare support are
much more complicated, however, when we
consider that such support is typically directed
at a family rather than at an individual. That
although the head of the family is the formal
recipient of any payments, the income of all of
the family members typically enters into the
computation of eligibility for support pay-
ments. A youth's response will depend upon
the manner in which the features ofthe welfare
program are transmitted to the youth through
family decision processes.
A family may behave like a single decision
unit, for example, maximizing family utility
subject to a budget constraint which involves
the earnings of all of the family members. In
effect, the youth's working behavior is deter-
mined jointly with the working behavior of all
of the other family members. A welfare pro-
gram that provides support to the family and
taxes additional family earnings will thus di-
rectly influence the behavior ofall family mem-
bers, since they are all interdependent.
Under a separate method of decision-mak-
however, the youth may view his income
as his own, so that any change in his situation
as a result of welfare is at the parents' discre-
tion. In this case, the youth's perception of his
income and net wage would not automatically
be affected by the family's participation in a
welfare program. But we could visualize some
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such effect if we make certain assumptions
about the way in which parental assistance to
their children is likely to be affected. For ex-
ample, the parents could choose to subsidize
the youth's leisure or schooling, as part of their
own consumption decision in response to re-
ceiving welfare support.
These examples illustrate the difficulty of
stating precisely how the features of family
welfare programs are transmitted to a young
worker. Let us assume simply that youth ex-
periences-to some degree-a reduction in net
wages and an improvement in non-wage in-
come as a result of the welfare program. What
are the likely effects of this changed economic
environment on the youth's labor-market be-
havior?
The simplest way to conceptualize the ef-
fects is to picture the youth making the choice
between work and leisure. The trade-off is an
obvious one--each additional hour of leisure
results in a loss of an hour's wages. Thus, the
opportunity cost or "price" of leisure is the
wage; in an environment in which taxes are
levied on wages, the after-tax wage is the price
of leisure.
A welfare program can affect this choice
because it increases the individual's income
and-because of support "phase out" provi-
sions-lowers the after-tax wage and thus the
"price" of leisure. Both of these changes
should increase the demand for leisure (in lieu
of work). This is because individuals tend to
consume more of a good (like leisure) as their
income rises or as the price of the good falls.
In the case of a welfare program, both effects
occur and reinforce one another.
This simple argument thus suggests that a
welfare program will tend to decrease the will-
ingness to work on the part of the affected
individuals, everything else being equal; that
is, it will cause a reduction in labor supply.
However, this does not lead to dearcut infer-
ences concerning the effect of welfare on the
unemployment rate. An increase in that rate
requires withdrawal from work without an off-
setting withdrawal from the labor force. The
simple labor-supply model presented above
cannot distinguish between these two effects.Since the forces which are likely to reduce
employment are also likely to reduce labor-
force participation, it is not possible apriori to
determine which effect dominates even with a
more complex model.
7 Thus, although it is
fairly clear that a welfare program will tend to
reduce labor supply, the net effect of welfare
on unemployment is theoretically ambiguous.
In sum, theory suggests that young people
will reduce work in response to a welfare pro-
gram if family decision processes cause them
to experience a reduction in net wages and an
increase in non-wage income. But the reduc-
tion in work effort mayor may not increase
measured unemployment-whether unem-
ployment rises or falls when welfare benefits
rise is an empirical issue. This paper sheds
light on this issue by using data from awelfare
experiment. We examine the effects of welfare
support separately on the labor-force partici-
pation and job-taking behavior of youth, to
provide some insight into the possible effects
of welfare on unemployment. The results, as
we will see, suggest that youth do respond to
their family welfare situation in a way which
could increase measured unemployment.
II. Welfare Experiments
Interest in experimenting with alternative headed) and was designed to be more gener-
welfare systems has been prompted by several ous than the typical AFDC program.
criticisms of the AFDC program, the primary Approximately 4,800 families with below-
component of the U.S. welfare system. First, median incomes in Seattle and Denver became
although AFDC is a Federal program, it is involved. As in a scientific experiment, some
administered by the states, and the provisions of the subjects received experimental "treat-
vary state-by-state depending upon the ability ment" while some served as the control group.
and willingness of individual states to provide Those in the treatment group were eligible to
welfare support. Large interstate differentials receive support under one of eleven NIT pro-
in program payments have been criticized as grams. The control group was not eligible to
inequitable. Second, some states restrict receive any support through the NIT, but con-
AFDC support to families which do not have trol families were free to enroll in the AFDC
a father present. This has led to the charge programs existing in their states. This control
that AFDC encourages the breakup of fami- group was the benchmark against which the
lies. Third, AFDC benefits are reduced response of the treatment group to the NIT
sharply as earned income rises. This high rate programs was measured.
of "taxation" of additional family earnings has The eleven experimental NIT programs of
been criticized as a work disincentive. Finally, SIME/DIME represented different combina-
AFDC has been criticized for not being gen- tions ofwelfare-support levels and tax rates on
erous enough, on the grounds that a wealthy earned income-the program feature which
society should do more for its poor members. determines the rate at which benefits are re-
The Seattle and Denver Income Mainte- duced as earned income rises. The support
nance Experiments (SIME and DIME respec- level was between $3,800 and $5,600 (in 1971
tively) were designed to test a welfare program dollars) for a family of four. The "phase out"
addressing these criticisms. The experimental tax rate was between 50 and 80 percent;8 a
program was called a "negative income tax" family on a program with an 80-percent tax
(NIT), reflecting the view that welfare support rate, for example, would lose 80 cents of sup-
should be a logical downward extension of the port for each additional dollar of earned in-
positive tax system. However, these NIT ex- come.
periments and the traditional welfare pro- In comparison with the AFDC programs
grams differed in detail rather than in concept. then existing in the states of Washington and
Specifically, the NIT embraced all households Colorado, these program parameters provided
(husband-wife households as well as female- relatively generous welfare assistance. That is,
29a family in the treatment group would have a
higher family income under SIME and DIME
than one with the same characteristics could
enjoy under the existing AFDC program.
In terms ofimpact on labor-supply behavior,
the SIME and DIME programs unambigu-
ously offered greater disincentives to work
than the existing welfare program. This is be-
cause both the support level and the tax rates
were higher under SIME and DIME than un-
der the existing AFDC alternative.
9 By com-
paring the behavior of youth in the treatment
group with that of the control group, we are
able to evaluate the effect of these greater
disincentives.
III. Empirical Analysis
The welfare experiments generated a wealth
of data on the labor-market behavior of indi-
viduals in the treatment and control groups.
The data were collected through a series of
periodic interviews conducted at the time of
enrollment and also throughout the course of
the experiment. For the purposes of our study,
youths were defined as individuals who were
between 16 and 21 years of age, and living at
home, at the time their families enrolled in the
experiment.
Since we are interested primarily in the pos-
sible effects of the welfare program on meas-
ured youth unemployment, we focus on two
aspects of labor-market behavior that can in-
fluence this measure. The first is labor-force
participation behavior. We measure the impact
of the experiment by examining the age at
which the youths in the experiment first report
an active search for work. By contrasting the
age offirst participation ofthe treatment group
with that of the control group, we are able to
obtain a crude indication ofthe extent to which
the welfare experiment delays youth labor-
force participation. The second aspect we ex-
amine is job-taking behavior. By comparing
the age at which the youths in the treatment
group first take full or part-time jobs with the
experience of the control group, we are able
to estimate the extent to which the welfare
experiment delays youth employment.
We can deduce the experiment's impact on
unemployment in a rough way by comparing
the labor-force participationeffectwith the job-
taking effect. If, for example, welfare tends to
delay jobtaking without delaying labor-force
participation, the behavior of these first-time
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job seekers would tend to add to measured
youth unemployment. Whether the overall
unemployment rate rises, however, depends
upon their later behavior. If welfare causes a
youth to stay in a job longer, for example, this
would tend to offset the effect on the unem-
ployment rate of delays in taking the first job.
However, the unemployment of entrants into
the job market is a major factor in the high
youth-unemployment statistics; the unemploy-
ment rate for youths with previous employ-
ment is close to the adult unemployment rate. 10
Thus it seems likely that a further delay in
employment caused by welfare support would
translate into a higher overall youth-unem-
ployment rate.
This is admittedly a very crude method for
discerning the impact of the experiment on
unemployment. Ideally, the unemployment
rate should be studied directly, by simply mea-
suring the percentage of young people who
report themselves to be participating in the
labor force but without a job at a particular
point in time. By contrasting the control
group's and the treatment group's unemploy-
ment rates, the effect of the experimental pro-
gram could then be obtained directly. Unfor-
tunately, however, the data available at the
time of the study were not suitable to this
approach, since the employment status of in-
dividuals could not be determined precisely on
a day-to-day basis, making direct calculation
of unemployment rates impossible.
ll Still, de-
spite the limitations of our approach, it can
provide useful indications of the way in which
the youth unemployment may be affected by
welfare policy.IV. Statistical Procedures
The behavior of the treatment group is com-
pared with that of the control group by esti-
mating the coefficients of a simple regression
equation using the cross-section of data from
the youth sample. The general form of the
equation is
H = Fc + Xb + Ce + E (1)
where
H = measures of labor-market behavior
(i.e., age at entry into the labor force or
age at which a job is taken).
F=dummy variable which = 1 if the indi-
vidual is in the treatment group and =
aif in the control group.
X = set of demographic variables to control
for personal or family attributes which
may affect labor-market behavior (see
Table 1).
C = set of variables to control for other ex-
periment features which may affect la-
bor-market behavior, such as schooling
subsidies (see Appendix B).
E = error component,
and c, band e are vectors of coefficients to be
estimated. This general equation was esti-
mated for three different dependent variables:
HI' age of initial labor-force entrance; Hz, age
of taking a full-time job; and H3, age oftaking
a part-time job.
The experiment's effect on these measures
is represented by the coefficient on the dummy
variable F. Thus, if those youths eligible for
welfare assistance delay the age at which they
take jobs (relative to controls), the coefficient
on F measures the extent of the delay (in
years). The other explanatory variables (sets




Variable name Variable definition
SEATTLE Dummy variable; takes on the value I if
youth is from Seattle site. and 0 if from
Denver
BLACK Dummy variable; takes on the value I if
youth is black. and 0 if otherwise
CHICANO Dummy variable: takes on the value I if
youth is Chicano, and 0 if otherwise
SINGLEHEAD Dummy variable: takes on the value I if
the youth is from a female-headed (fath-
erless) household. and 0 if otherwise
FAMILYSIZE Number of familv members in the youth's
family at time (;f enrollment in the ex-
periment
CHILDREN Number of children younger than 5 years
of age in the family at time of enrollment
in the experiment
INCOME Family income (in dollars) at time of en-
rollment in the experiment
which may influence labor-market behavior,
thereby permitting the effects of the experi-
ment to be isolated. Table 1 lists the demo-
graphic variables (set X) which are employed
to control for the effects of personal or family
attributes on labor-market behavior. Appendix
B discusses those variables (set C) which are
used to control for the design features of the
experiment; these variables are not discussed
further because they are not relevant to the
issues addressed in this paper.
The regression equations were estimated
separately for the 517 males and 485 females
in the sample, because the labor-market be-
havior of these groups differed considerably in
the early years of their work experience. Ap-
pendix B provides further details ofthe sample
and the econometric techniques employed in
estimating the regression equations.
V. Results: Effects of Experiment
The coefficients on the dummy variable F decisions to enter the labor force. That is, the
measure the effects ofwelfare eligibility on the measured delay of entry into the labor force
labor-market behavior of the youths in the associated with eligibility for the welfare pro-
sample. Table 2 summarizes these effects. gram (row one in Table 2) is not statistically
First, the experimental welfare program ap- different from zero for either males orfemales.
parently does not significantly affect individual Those youths whose families are eligible for
31welfare support thus appear to enter the labor
force at about the same age as youths in con-
trol families.
Second, the experimental program in con-
trast does appear to delay the age of initial full
time or part-time employment. For male
youths, welfare eligibility is associated with a
delay of .74 years in the age of full-time em-
ployment (row two). For females, the pro-
gram's effect is not significant for full-time em-
ployment but it is significant for part-time
employment, where welfare eligibility is asso-
ciated with a delay of .93 years. Thecoefficient
for part-time job-taking is not significant for
males, although the sign is the same as for
females. The greater sensitivity of males in the
full-time category and females in the part-time
category could be expected, because young fe-
males tend to seek part-time employment
while young males tend to be oriented toward
full-time employment.
These results suggest that the expected re-
duction in labor supply from the welfare pro-
gram primarily comes about because of delays
in accepting employment, rather than delays
in entering the labor force. These effects gen-
Table 2
Effects of Experimental Welfare Program
Delay (in years) Males Females
In joining the labor force
- .127 .149
(.287) (.208)
In taking a full-time job
.739** .183
(.267) (.143)
In taking a part-time job
.565 .929*
(.402) (.370)
Note: The delay experienced by those eligible for the
experimental welfare program is measured relative to the
behavior of the controls. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses.
'Coefficient differs from zero at the 5-percent level.
**Coefticient differs from zero at the I-percent level.
erate increases in measured unemployment
among youths just beginning their labor-mar-
ket experience. As mentioned earlier, the
available data are not sufficient to measure the
effect on unemployment rates, per se, but this
finding underscores the importance of consid-
ering supply-side factors when investigating
youth-unemployment phenomena.
VI. Results: Other Factors
The coefficients on the various demographic
control variables, (variable set x), while not
relevant to an evaluation of the welfare exper-
iment, usefully illustrate how other factors can
affect labor-market behavior. The coefficients
associated with these variables are presented
in Table 3.
The dummy variable SEATTLE indicates
the location of an individual in the sample,
whether Denver or Seattle. The coefficient on
this variable thus captures differences in labor-
market behavior in the two cities. Although
such differences could indicate either demand
or supply differences, in the present context
the coefficient most likely captures differences
in the demand for labor.
At the time of the experiments (early to
mid-1970's), the Seattle economy was severely
depressed because of a decline in the locally-
important aerospace industry. As a result, we
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would expect the demand for labor of all kinds
to be lower in Seattle than in Denver, and for
this to lead to delays in finding work. (It could
also discourage youths from entering the labor
force.) The expectation is borne out in the
positive sign of the Seattle dummy variable.
This implies that the age of labor-force entry
and (for females) the age of job-taking tended
to be higher in Seattle than Denver. Males in
Seattle, for example, took 1.47 years longer to
find a full-time job than their Denver counter-
parts. The fact that both the entry age and the
employment age were higher in Seattle illus-
trates the earlier point that the participation
decision and the employment decision tend to
be affected by the same factors and to move
in the same direction. The unemployment im-
pact depends upon the net effect of these fac-
tors. In the present case, the employment age
apparently is delayed by more than the entryage as a result of Seattle residency; this would
tend to make measured unemployment higher
there than in Denver.
The coefficients of the race variables
BLACK and CHICANO in Table 3 measure
the difference in behavior between non-white
and white youths. The coefficients suggest a
relationship between labor-market behavior
and race that is consistent with aggregate un-
employment statistics. Black males, for ex-
ample, enter the labor force .80 years later
than whites, and take full-time jobs and part-
time jobs 1.53 and.96 years later, respectively.
The greater delay in job-taking than in entry
is qualitatively consistent with the higher rates
of black youth unemployment that are typi-
cally observed in aggregate statistics. This phe-
nomenon may, of course, be a manifestation
of either demand or supply-side factors.
Among the Chicanos in the sample, the
greatest effect is observed among males. Rel-
ative to white youth, they experience delay in
full-time job taking of .80 years and in part-
time job taking of 1.03 years. The relative
delay in entering the labor force is not signif-
icant for males, but it is significant for Chicano
females.
The coefficients on the variables that de-
scribe family characteristics suggest that family
composition influences the participation and
job-taking decisions of youth as well. The
dummy variable SINGLEHEAD, for exam-
ple, indicates which youths come from female-
headed households. The negative sign on this
variable, for both males and females, suggests
that this family structure is associated with ear-
lier labor-force participation and earlier em-
ployment. However, the effects are only sig-
nificant for females.
The number of family members (measured
by FAMILYSIZE) appears to be negatively
related to the age at which youths enter the
labor force. An additional family member low-
ers the age of labor-force entry by .22 and .15
years for males and females, respectively.
However, for female youths, the presence of
Table 3
Coefficients Associated With Various Control Variables
Age of Entry into Age of Taking Age of Taking
Dependent variable Labor Force Full-time Job Part-time Job
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Independent variable
SEATILE (0.1) .024 .444* 1.475*** .603*** 277 .539
(.306) (.231) (.296) (.269) (.441) (.414)
BLACK (0.1) .809*** .209 1.526*** .962*** .924*** .359
(.310) (.225) (.294) (.267) (.443) (.404)
CHICANO (0.1) .558 .767*** .805** .336 1.034* .688
(.433) (.323) (.366) (.366) (.621) (.564)
SINGLEHEAD (0,1) - .545 .517** - .128 - .458 - .522 -1.011**
(.341) (.262) (.327) (.311 ) (.488) (.477)
FAMILY SIZE .218** .150* .019 J)61 0.226 -.108
(number) (.103) (.079) (.098) (.096) (.147) (.146)
CHILDREN - .260 .677*** - .029 .209 .268 .735
(number) (.4(5) (.254) (.365) (.317) (.555) (.474)
INCOME ($1000) .025 .008 .052 - '()63 - .044 .002
(.050) (.036) (.046) (.044) (J)75) (.007)
***Coefficient differs from zero at the 1 percent level.
**Coefficient differs from zero at the 5 percent level.
*Coefficient differs from zero at the 10 percent level.
33small children in the household (CHILDREN)
tends to delay labor-force participation, pre-
sumably because young females perform child-
care services in the home.
Family income (INCOME) appears to have
no statistically significant effect on youths' par-
ticipation and job-taking decisions. The signs
of the coefficients generally suggest delayed
entry but earlier job-taking, but the low level
of statistical precision suggests that these re-
sults may be spurious. Other observers have
noted the poor association between income
and youth unemployment, but in this study the
problem is compounded by the use of family
income to assign individuals to the welfare ex-
periment (see Appendix 3).
The statistical importance of many of these
demographic variables clearly indicates the va-
riety of factors accounting for observed pat-
terns oflabor-market behavior. Thus, no single
factor islikely to explain satisfactorily the level
and changes in youth-unemployment rates that
the United States has experienced in recent
years. Even after controlling for these demo-
graphic factors, however, an important asso-
ciation appears to exist between the experi-
mental welfare program and delayed youth
employment.
VII. Conclusions
It has not been possible to measure the im-
pact of a welfare program on youth unemploy-
ment directly. Nonetheless, the results ob-
served in this study are consistent with the
notion that youths respond to welfare pro-
grams by reducing labor-market activity. Thus,
young people do not appear to be insulated
from the work-retarding effects of welfare pro-
grams. 12
Secondly, the results are also consistent with
the argument that family welfare support con-
tributes to measured youth unemployment by
delaying employment without delaying entry
into the labor-force. Despite our inability to
calculate the precise effect ofthe experimental
welfare program on unemployment, we can
see that the delay in job-taking is large and
significant. For males taking full-time jobs, for
example, the delay caused by the experiment
is roughly the same as the delay associated
with being Chicano (rather than white). Since
Chicano unemployment rates are several per-
centage points greater than white unemploy-
ment rates, the effect of the welfare program
may be of that same order of magnitude.
Finally, and most importantly, the study
highlights the relevance of considering supply
as well as demand factors in studying the
youth-unemployment problem. There may be
considerably more volition in the pattern of
youth unemployment than is generally as-
sumed. Although it is very difficult to deter-
mine precisely the effect of supply-side fac-
tors--such as attitudes, tastes, family structure,
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and family economic status-these factors may
contribute significantly to the trends that have
been observed in youth unemployment. Policy
prescriptions thus can differ considerably, de-
pending upon whether the problem has a de-
mand-side or supply-side genesis. The results
of this study suggest that a policy to eradicate
youth unemployment by making jobs more
available-through public-employment pro-
grams, for example-may not be completely
successful in reducing unemployment among
youths from welfare families.
Unfortunately, we cannot use the results of
this study to infer how the existing welfare
program affects youth labor-market behavior.
Although the experimental welfare programs
were more conducive to creating unemploy-
ment than the existing (AFDC) program, their
effects were measured against the effects of
the existing program since the control group
remained eligible for AFDC. Therefore, our
results may either over- or under-state the ef-
fects of the existing program (vs. no welfare
program). However, the results do suggest
qualitatively that the existing welfare program
contributes to youth-employment problems.
Much remains to be learned about the
causes of joblessness among the young. The
problem is a multifaceted one, and no single
factor can be held responsible for the trends
that have been observed in youth labor-market
behavior. Still, our results emphasize one po-
tential source ofyouth unemployment that pol-
icymakers should consider and explore further.Appendix A: Experimentation in Economics
Although experimental research is common-
place in laboratory sciences such as chemistry
and pharmacology, it is unusual in economics.
Economists do not, in general, have the op-
portunity to manipulate economic variables in
a controlled manner and observe the conse-
quences on individual firms or households in
the economy. Economics is, by its very nature,
a social science, and most economic research
involves observation of behavior in the natural
state of the economy. The relationships be-
tween economic variables are normally in-
ferred from observed patterns of behavior in
the context of a model, utilizing a set of sta-
tistical procedures that are consistent with the
assumptions of the model.
What is an economic experiment?
In contrast to the "arm's length" nature of
most economic analysis, economic experimen-
tation involves direct manipulation of eco-
nomic variables. In the typical economic ex-
periment, a site for the experiment (usually a
community or area) is selected, and part ofthe
population ofthe area is enrolled to participate
in the experiment. The participants are as-
signed to either a "treatment group" or a
"control group." The economic environment
Experiment
Table A-1







6. Electric power rates
7. Medicare coverage
8. Public employment
9. Youth employment subsidy
New Jersey; Pennsylvania (1968);




Dayton, Ohio; Seattle, Washington;
selected counties in Massachusetts
and South Carolina (1973)
Fifteen different cities and rural
areas (1975)
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Salt Lake
Citv, Utah; West Palm Beach,
F1o'rida (1975)
Various sites including Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona;
Green Bay, Wisconsin; and South
Bend, Indiana (1976)
Six utilities in various states (1976)
Entire state of Colorado (1976)
Thirty sites in various states (1979)
Detroit, Michigan (in the planning
stage)
35
To evaluate the effects of a negative
incomc tax on aggregate labor supply.
To evaluate the response of health-care
demand to changes in the price of health-
care services.
To test the effectiveness of job-training
programs on individuals with traditionally
poor records of employability, such as ex-
offenders and former drug addicts.
To evaluate the effect of job counseling on
the labor-market experience of the
unemployed.
To evaluate the effect of cash housing
allowances on the demand and supply of
housing.
To evaluate the effect of different
electricity-rate schedules on the
consumption of electric power, with
particular emphasis on time-of-day pricing.
To evaluate alternative coverage plans on
the use and cost of mental-health services.
To evaluate the effect of a large-scale
public-employment program on
employment and wages through the use of
treatment and control sites (demonstration
project combined with policy experiments).
To evaluate the effect of wage subsidies on
youth employment.of the treatment group is manipulated as part
of the experiment, while the control group is
simply a source of "baseline" data. The com-
parison of the behavior of the treatment and
control groups measures the effect of the ex-
perimental program. (The use of a control
group distinguishes an experiment from a dem-
onstration; the latter is simply a test of the
administrative feasibility of a project, and can-
not provide a precise evaluation of its effects.)
Economicexperiments have been conducted
in a wide range of policy contexts. Experi-
ments have involved manipulation ofsuch eco-
nomic variables as electricity prices, housing
rentals, health-care costs, education costs, and
the generosityofwelfare programs. (See Table
A-I for a partial list of recent economic ex-
periments.)
Experimental vs non-experimental
Although the non-experimental mode of
analysis has served the economics profession
well, the available theory or data are not al-
ways sufficient to provide the information nec-
essary to resolve practical problems. Simple
parameters such as the elasticity of labor sup-
ply with respect to the wage rate, for example,
have been disturbingly difficult to estimate us-
ing non-experimental procedures. As a result,
economic analysis has provided little help to
policymakers interested in accurately predict-
ing the labor-market effects of proposals such
as a negative income tax, wage subsidies, pub-
lic-employment programs, and so on.
Experimentation offers several advantages
for policy evaluation. First, the direction and
magnitude of the effect of one economic vari-
able on another can potentially be measured
with considerable precision, because the policy
variable can be exogenously manipulated in a
measurable way. The price of a commodity,
the income of an individual, or the quality of
a product can be manipulated at will, inde-
pendent of other variables. In the non-exper-
imental environment, these changes usually
occur in concert with other changes, making it
difficult to isolate the effects of individual fac-
tors and the direction of causality.
Second, experimentation offers the oppor-
tunity to examine a variety of social effects of
a policy--often beyond that which economic
modelling and analysis is capable ofdoing with
non-experimental data. For example, the ef-
fect of a policy on the child-bearing or marital
behavior of a family is very difficult to predict
precisely with existing economic models and
data. Yet these effects may be very important
to policymakers and may have important eco-
nomic implications as well. An experiment can
be designed to monitor these effects.
Finally, experimentation permits programs
with complex economic and administrative
features to be evaluated. It is often very dif-
ficult to model these features and evaluate the
response without making many questionable
assumptions. By putting the policy into prac-
tice on an experimental basis and observing
the consequences, the effects of a specific pro-
gram can be directly evaluated.
Appendix B: Technical Details of the Model and Sample
Econometric Considerations
Estimation of the relationship in equation
(I) encounters a number of econometric prob-
lems. First, the data on the dependent varia-
bles (Hp H2, and H 3) suffer from "censoring"
because of the relatively short observation pe-
riod. To understand this problem of censoring,
suppose, for example, that a youth never takes
a full-time job during the course of the obser-
vation period. What age should then be used
to construct H2? The only available datum is
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the youth's age at the time when he was last
observed. This age is clearly less than the true
age at which he ultimately takes a job, how-
ever; that is, the measure is "censored" from
above. Similarly, if a youth already has labor-
market experience when first enrolled in the
experiment, the only information we have is
his age at that time; these observations are
censored from below.
The econometric implication is that the dis-
tribution ofthe error term in equation (1) doesnot have the properties assumed in the classi-
cal regression model. Without appropriate
treatment of this effect, the estimated coeffi-
cients are biased. However, with a procedure
developed by James Tobin (called Tobit), we
are able to obtain unbiased estimation under
the conditions created by censored data.
13 The
procedure uses the age at which the observa-
tion was censored along with the information
about the type of censoring experienced (i.e.,
from above or below). The program employs
maximum likelihood techniques to derive the
necessary estimates, but the coefficients may
be interpreted in the normal manner.
A second major statistical concern involves
defining the independent variables so that the
effect of the experiments is not commingled
with variables which we are using for control
purposes. For example, the experiment could
conceivably affect the family's childbearing be-
havior. Thus, if the variable FAMILYSIZE is
measured during the experiment, it may con-
tain some effects of the experiments, thereby
biasing the measure of the experimental effect
obtained with the variable F. The approach
taken here to limit this bias involves using pre-
experimental measures of all of the control
variables. This ensures that these measures are
unaffected by the experiment. Although this
method introduces measurement error-since
the pre-experimental values may be imprecise
measures of the relevant value-it is assumed
that these effects are less serious than the
problem of commingling experimental and
control variables.
Additional control variables
In addition to the variables reported in Table
1, two additional types of variables were in-
cluded in the variable set C in order to control
for features of the experiment which would
influence the behavior of the individuals in the
sample. First, in addition to the welfare pro-
visions of the experiments, certain families
were eligible for manpower programs that pro-
vided subsidies for training and educational
activities. To control for these effects, the
regressions contain dummy variables for each
manpower program. The coefficients of these















Hours worked per week
at enrollment 6.4 4.5
2'/2 years into experiment 16.9 15.5
School registration (%)
at enrollment 73.9 79.9
2'/2 years into experiment 27.8 27.2
Outside labor force (%)
at enrollment 51.3 62.9
2'/2 years into experiment 44.0 57.5
Family type at enrollment (%)
Husband-wife 44.1 43.3
Female head 55.9 56.7
Treatment status (%)
Eligible for experimental 52.4 51.1
welfare program
Seattle residency (%) 39.5 48.5
Persons in family (No.) 4.8 4.6
Young Children in family (No.) .1 .2
Family income ($) 6,511.0 6,680,0
Sample size 517 485
zero, and are not reported here because these
programs are not of direct interest to our dis-
cussion.
A final consideration involves the need to
control for the way in which families were as-
signed to the control groupvs. the "treatment"
group. As is typical in many experimental de-
signs, the assignment was not completely ran-
dom because of cost considerations; in partic-
ular, each family's pre-enrollment income was
one of the characteristics used to assign exper-
imental treatment. This non-random assign-
ment can cause bias in the measurement ofthe
coefficients.
14 The simplest approach to mini-mize this bias is to include (as we do) a dummy
variable in the regression which indicates
which income-classification group the family
was placed in for purposes of assignment to
experimental treatment. (Because the coeffi-
cients on these dummy variables have no pol-
icy interpretation, they are not discussed in
this paper. However, it should be noted that
the use of two "income" variables-the con-
trol dummies and INCOME-makes it diffi-
cult to interpret the latter's coefficients.)
Description ofsample
The individuals chosen for use in this study
were between 16 and 21 years of age at the
time that their families agreed to participate in
the experiment. The sample was confined to
the sons, daughters, grandsons, granddaugh-
ters, stepsons or stepdaughters of the head of
the household. All were living with their fam-
ilies at the time of enrollment in the experi-
ment.
The experiments did not enroll families
headed by a single male, but over half of the
sample was composed of female-headed
households. The families in the experiment
were chosen with incomes at or below the 1971
median income. In order to permit estimation
of effects by race, black and Chicano families
were heavily sampled. Table B-1 contains se-
lected statistics which describe the sample.
FOOTNOTES
1. The literature on youth unemployment is extensive. A
broad and useful introduction to the topic is available in
The Teenage Unemployment Problem: What are the
Options? Congressional Budget Office (October 1976).
2. See, for example, Welch (1974), Gramlich (1976) and
Ragan (1977).
3. Ragan (1977).
4. This argument has been put forth by Moynihan (1968),
for example.
5. See Freeman (1979).
6. See, for example, Ashenfelter and Heckman (1979),
Killingsworth (1976), and MacDonald and Stephanson
(forthcoming).
7. Seater analyzes labor-force behavior in the context of
an optimal-control model which permits simultaneous de-
termination of the optimal paths of time allocation to labor,
job search and leisure over the life cycle. He concludes,
"The response of unemployment [to exogenous changes]
is ambiguous because unemployment is a "middle" state
between employment and nonparticipation. Changes
which tend to induce some people to leave unemployment
for employment also tend to induce other people to leave
nonparticipation for unemployment, leaving the net
change in unemployment ambiguous." Seater (1977), p.
369.
8. Six of the programs employed fixed tax rates of either
50, 70 or 80 percent. The other five programs employed
a rate which was initially at one of these levels, but de-
clined with increasing income. These declining tax-rate
programs were designed to determine if the work disin-
centive effects of the NIT could be eased by a smoother
transition between NIT tax rates and the tax rates of the
normal (positive) income-tax system.
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9. At the time of the experiments, the statutory tax rate
embodied in the AFDC program was 67 percent. However,
as Halsey (1978) has shown, when the integration of
AFDC with other welfare programs (housing and food-
stamp programs) and the positive income-tax system is
properly analyzed, the effective tax rate is around 47
percent, a lower rate than the effective tax rates employed
in the SIME and DIME programs.
10. Freeman (1979), Table 2.
11. The construction of the spell-oriented data file nec-
essary for this computation is feasible, however, using the
raw SIME and DIME data. The construction of such a data
file may be undertaken by SRI International in 1980.
12. Although we are interested in the effects on measured
unemployment per se, from a long-run policy point of
view, the delays in job-taking need not be wholly delete-
rious. For example, youth may be spending more time in
school as a result of family welfare support. The evidence
on this from the SIME and DIME programs is not very
encouraging, however. West (1979) found that the exper-
iments were not associated with significant increases in
school-going propensity.
13. See Tobin (1958). The program used in this analysis
was written by Arden Hall of SRI.
14. The seriousness of the bias caused by non-random
assignment has been the subject of considerable debate.
In this research, the results were not noticeably changed
when the variables designed to correct for assignment
were omitted from the regression specification. For a dis-
cussion of experimental assignment procedures and their
effects, see Conlisk and Watts (1979) and Keeley and
Robins (forthcoming).REFERENCES
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